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We provide a dynamic extension of an economy with search on credit and labor markets
(Wasmer and Weil, 2004). Financial frictions add an additional, almost acyclical, entry cost
to procyclical job creation costs, thus increasing the elasticity of labor market tightness to pro-
ductivity shocks by a factor of 2 to 6, compared to a matching economy with perfect ﬁnancial
markets. We characterize a dynamic ﬁnancial multiplier, show it is increasing in total ﬁnan-
cial costs, and is minimized under a credit market Hosios-Pissarides rule. We conclude that
ﬁnancial frictions are an element of the solution to the volatility puzzle
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Cole and Rogerson (1999) and Shimer (2005) have investigatedt h ec y c l i c a lp r o p e r t i e so fs e a r c h
matching models following Pissarides (1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The cele-
brated Shimer’s puzzle is the demonstration of the inabilityo ft h ec o n v e n t i o n a lm a t c h i n gm o d e l
to replicate US statistics regarding the volatility of job vacancies, unemployment and their ratio
(called labor market tightness), in response to productivity shocks. Shimer’s main ﬁnding is that
the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks is around 20 in the data, and around
1i nac a l i b r a t i o no ft h eM o r t e n s e n - P i s s a r i d e sm o d e l .S e v e r al calibration improvements have been
proposed. One of them, called the “small labor surplus” assumption (Hagedorn and Manovskii,
2008), implies a calibrated value of non-employment utilityt h a ti sc l o s et om a r k e tp r o d u c t i v i t y ,
within only a few percentage points, and very low values for the bargaining power of workers.
Consequently, ﬁrms make small proﬁts and are more responsivet op r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c k s ,l e a d i n g
the market to be overall more volatile. Other promising roadsh a v eb e e np r o p o s e d ,s u c ha sw a g e
rigidity (Hall 2005) and on-the-job search (Mortensen and Nagypàl, 2007). The latter paper also
makes the point that a large part of ﬂuctuations in the unemployment/vacancy ratio is not due to
productivity shocks. Since the partial correlation betweent i g h t n e s sa n dp r o d u c t i v i t yi sa r o u n d
40%, a lower value of the elasticity to productivity needs to be matched. Pissarides (2009) retains
av a l u eo f7 . 5 6 . 1
One line of research that has so far been ignored is the existenceof credit market imperfections.
Indeed, it has been knownfor a whilethat credit market imperfectionsgenerate additionalvolatility
in models of the business cycle. Early papers such as Bernankea n dG e r t l e r( 1 9 8 9 ) ,K i y o t a k ia n d
Moore (1997) and subsequent papers (such as Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist, 1996, among others), have emphasized the ampliﬁcation role of credit markets and
the existence of a ﬁnancial accelerator.A l t h o u g hp a r to ft h i sl i t e r a t u r ei sc e n t e r e do nt h ec r e d i t
channel of monetary policy, the elements that give rise to ampliﬁcation may be relevant for the
study of cyclical ﬂuctuations in labor markets.2
1See Pissarides (2009) page 1351, footnote 15.
2At the microeconomic level, there exists a body of empirical research on the effects of ﬁnancial frictions on ﬁrm
employment decisions. Beginning with Sharpe (1994) using U.S. manufacturing data,m o r eﬁ n a n c i a l l yc o n s t r a i n e d
ﬁrms have a more cyclical labor force. Speciﬁcally, employment at these ﬁrms is more responsive to demand shocks.
More recently, Benmelech et al. (2011) have shown that ﬁnancial constraints affect ﬁrm-level employment decisions,
1In this paper we pursue this logic, starting from the simple, steady state, setup of Wasmer and
Weil (2004) who introduce ﬁnancial imperfections in a Mortensen-Pissarides economy with two
matching functions – one in the labor market, one in the creditm a r k e t . 3 We provide a dynamic,
stochasticextension of this model, reinterpreting the ﬁrm as an entity managing several “marginal”
investment projects, each requiring labor and ﬁnancing fromab a n k e ro naf r i c t i o n a lc r e d i tm a r k e t .
In this interpretation, the relevant ﬁnancial costs affect all ﬁrms, not only new ﬁrms.4
Our paper has four contributions. First, we derive a dynamic ﬁnancial multiplier, the analogue
to the static context in Wasmer and Weil (2004), and clearly identify the manner in which ﬁnancial
imperfections raise the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks. In the standard
search and matching model with no ﬁnancial market imperfections, the increase in the vacancy-
unemployment ratio following a positive productivity shockc a u s e sar i s ei nt h ed u r a t i o no fs e a r c h
for ﬁrms to ﬁll a vacancy. This increase in costs limits the incentive for ﬁrms to post vacancies.
The introduction of ﬁnancial frictions gives rise to an additional entry cost for ﬁrms, the cost of
accessing ﬁnance. In equilibrium, any improvementin expected productivity,and therefore proﬁts,
attracts ﬁrms and banks in ﬁxed proportions such that credit market tightness is always constant
and the cost of accessing ﬁnance for ﬁrms is almost acyclical. As a result, the total cost of creating
aj o bi sl e s ss e n s i t i v et oc h a n g e si nl a b o rm a r k e tt i g h t n e s sa nd the associated congestion effects.
Consequently, job creation responds more to changes in productivity thereby amplifying business
cycle ﬂuctuations. Here, we join Pissarides (2009) in arguing that part of the solution to the labor
market volatility puzzle requires that hiring costs must be partly non-proportional to congestion in
the labor market.5
Second, we show that there exists a link between the size of theﬁ n a n c i a lm u l t i p l i e ra n da n
efﬁciency rule in the credit market. Indeed, the social optimum is achieved when the bargaining
and Caggese and Cunat (2008), in an estimated model, have shown that the volatility of total employment is signiﬁ-
cantly higher for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms than for ﬁnancially unconstrained ones.
3Petrosky-Nadeau (2009) considers the case of external ﬁnancing of period operating expenses, including recruit-
ing costs, on imperfect credit markets. The imperfection takes the form of an agency problem between borrower and
lender and, as in this paper, ﬁnancial frictions amplify the business cycle of labor market variables.
4The closest paperrelatedto oursis an unpublishedmanuscriptby Nicolettiand Pierrard(2006). Theirworkallows
for two types of ﬁrms, one of which must borrow on a search frictional credit market. They focus on the implications
forcross-correlationsbetweenreal quantitiessuchasoutputandconsumptionand,whilenotemphasizingthefeedback
from credit to labor markets, they do discuss the existence ofaﬁ n a n c i a lm u l t i p l i e r .
5This mechanism differs from the extensive literature on the role of credit market frictionsfor business cycles. The
mechanismis notbased on a collateralconstraint, as in Kiyotaki and Moore(1997),noron countercylicalagency costs
as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
2power of ﬁrms vis-à-vis banks is equal to the elasticity of thec r e d i tﬁ n d i n gr a t eo fﬁ r m sw i t hr e -
spect to credit market tightness(the so-called Hosios-Pissarides condition,Pissarides 1990). When
this happens, congestion externalities from the matching process are internalized by rent sharing.
We show that this condition also implies that search costs in the credit market are minimized, and
so is the ﬁnancial multiplier. Relaxing the condition instead leads to a larger ﬁnancial multiplier,
because away from that condition, the crowding-out effects in ﬁnancial markets are higher: either
the demand or the supply of credit increases to generate higher ﬁnancial costs in the economy. This
raises the constant part in entry costs of ﬁrms and then, as explained above, further raises volatility.
We show that the model can match or even overshoot the elasticity of labor market tightness to
productivity shocks observed in the data.
Third, we illustrate these results under a set of parameter values that allows us to match the
share of the ﬁnancial sector in GDP in the US. These parametersd e v i a t es u b s t a n t i a l l yf r o mt h e
credit market Hosios-Pissarides rule, the relative bargaining power of banks relative to ﬁrms being
between 0.68 and 0.90 and the elasticity of the credit matching function 0.5, such that the model
implies large elasticities of labor market tightness to productivity shocks. This results in a ﬁnancial
multiplier between 2.3 and 6. In our preferred speciﬁcation,w h i c hm a t c h e sa ne l a s t i c i t yo f7 ,t h e
value of the multiplier is 2.86 and the share of banks in bargaining with the ﬁrm is 0.88.
Fourth, this result is obtained while restricting the economic costs of ﬁnancial intermediation
within an empirically plausible range, and wages at three quarters of labor productivity. Thus,
ampliﬁcation of the v-u ratio to productivity here does not rely on the “small labor surplus” as-
sumption of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Financial marketi m p e r f e c t i o n se n a b l eu st op a r t l y
relax the small labor surplus assumption in order to match thee l a s t i c i t yo fm a r k e tt i g h t n e s st o
productivity found in the data, a desirable implication given the concerns raised by assuming small
proﬁts to labor for the behavior of the search model to changesi np o l i c yp a r a m e t e r s( e . g . ,C o s t a i n
and Reiter, 2008). Obtaining an elasticity of the v-u ratio of2 0 ,a sr e t a i n e db yS h i m e r( 2 0 0 5 ) ,
requires a ﬁnancial multiplier of 6.05. This can be achieved by reducing the bargaining power
of workers close to the calibrated value retained by Hagedorna n dM a n o v s k i i( 2 0 0 8 ) .H o w e v e r ,
the model still does not require the assumption of a small labor surplus as wages are kept at three
quarters of labor productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the setup of our dynamic
3model and derive its entry condition. In Section 3, we derive the elasticity of labor market tight-
ness to productivity shocks and show how the Hosios-Pissarides rule in the credit market affects
the volatility of the labor market. In Section 4, we describe the parameterization strategy and illus-
trate how deviating away from Hosios-Pissarides substantially raises the elasticity of labor market
tightness in Section 5. In Section 6, we conclude that ﬁnancial frictions are an element of the
solution to the volatility puzzle as they imply job creation costs that are partly non-proportional to
congestion in the labor market.
2 An Economy with Credit and Labor Market Frictions
2.1 Setup
Time is discrete. There are three types of agents: new projects in need of capital; banks with no
ability to produce; and workers with no capital and no investmentproject. The timing of events for
new projects is as follows. First, a project requires a "banker" in order to ﬁnance the installation
costs and recruiting a worker. This search process costs e units of effort per period. Search is
successful with probability pt.T h en e w l y f o r m e d p r o d u c t i o n u n i t i s r e f e r r e dt o a sa ﬁ r m ,b u tit
is in fact a marginal project that found ﬁnancing. This entityt h e ng o e s ,i nas e c o n ds t a g e ,t o
the labor market. The bank ﬁnances the vacancy posting cost γ to attract workers (the so-called
recruitment costs) for the ﬁrm. This search process succeedsw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yqt.T h eﬁ r mi st h e n
able, in the third stage, to produce and sell in the goods market, which generates a ﬂow proﬁt
yt  wt  Ψt where yt is the marginal product, wt is the wage, and Ψt is the ﬂow repayment to the
bank (determined through bargaining). Call r the per-period discount rate, which is constant due
to the assumption of risk neutral agents.
Labor productivity is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process yt = ρyyt 1 +νt,w h e r e
0 < ρy < 1a n dνt is white noise. We assume for convenience that a new project meeting a banker
begins the recruiting process within the period. A successful meeting between a ﬁrm and worker
begins production the following period. Firms are subject tod e s t r u c t i o ns h o c k sw i t he x o g e n o u s
probability s,w h i c ha l s oe n t a i lt h ed e s t r u c t i o no ft h ea s s o c i a t e dj o b .
The asset values of the project in the three stages described above are denoted by Ej,t with j =
c,l or g,s t a n d i n g ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,f o rt h ec r e d i t ,l a b o ra n dg o o d sm a rkets, the market in which the
4project is operating. We also assume free entry on the credit market, that is Ec,t   0f o ra l lt.W e
therefore have the following Bellman equations:




















where Et is an expectations operator over productivity. In the secondl i n e ,t h eh i r i n gc o s tγ does
not show up because it is ﬁnanced by the bank.
Symmetrically, the bank’s asset values are denoted by Bj,t, j = c, l or g for each of the stages:
in the ﬁrst stage, the bank screens projects, in the second stage it ﬁnances the posting of a vacancy,
and in the third stage it enjoys the repayment Ψt from the project. We also assume free entry on
the bank side of the credit market implying Bc,t = 0  t.W ed e n o t eb yκ the screening cost per unit
of time incurred by banks in the ﬁrst stage, and by   pt the probability with which a bank ﬁnds a
project to be ﬁnanced. We have:





















Matching in the labor market is denoted by Ml(Vt,ut) where ut is the rate of unemployment and
the total number of unemployed workers since the labor force is normalized to 1. Vt is the number
of "vacancies," that is, the number of ﬁrms in stage l.T h ef u n c t i o ni sa l s oa s s u m e dt ob ec o n s t a n t
returns to scale, hence the rate at which ﬁrms ﬁll vacancies isaf u n c t i o no ft h er a t i oVt/ut = θt,o r




with q (θt) < 0.
5Onthecreditmarket, thematchingrates pt and   pt aremademutuallyconsistentbytheexistence
of a matching function Mc(Bt,Et),w h e r eBt and Et are, respectively, the number of bankers and
of projects in stage c.T h i sf u n c t i o ni sa s s u m e dt oh a v ec o n s t a n tr e t u r n st os c a l e .We denote by φt
the ratio Et/Bt,w h i c hi sar e ﬂ e c t i o no ft h et e n s i o ni nt h ec r e d i tm a r k e ta n dt hat we shall call credit
market tightness from the point of view of new projects. Under the assumption of constant returns




= p(φt) with p (φt) < 0.
  pt = φtp(φt) with   pt
 (φt) > 0.
The ﬁrst line states that matching with a bank is decreasing inc r e d i tm a r k e tt i g h t n e s s .T h es e c o n d
states that the rate at which banks match with a project is increasing in the relative abundance of
investment projects.
2.3 Bargaining and Equilibrium in the Credit Market
After contact, the bank and the ﬁrm, owner of the investment project, engage in bargaining about




.T h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l i z e d N a s h b a r g a i n i n g p r o b l e m
implies the sharing rule at the time of the meeting:
(1 β)Bl,t = βEl,t (7)
where β   (0,1) is the bargaining power of the bank relative to the ﬁrm. With β = 0t h eb a n k
leaves all the surplus to the ﬁrm. Combining (1), (4) and (7), we obtain the equilibrium value of
credit market tightness φt.I t t u r n s o u t t o b e a c o n s t a n t i n t i m e , a f u n c t i o n o f p a r a m e t e r sa si n







The fact that this is constant is due to the assumption of double free entry on credit markets, by
both banks and ﬁrms. Any improvement in expected productivity, and therefore proﬁts, attracts
ﬁrms and banks in ﬁxed proportions such that the ratio is always constant.
62.4 Equilibrium in the Labor Market and Repayment to Banks
From the constant values of being in the recruiting stage, Bl,t = κ
φ p(φ ) and El,t = e
p(φ ),we obtain a






























These two equations are obtained by equating the forward value of Bl,t and El,t,e q u a t i o n s( 2 )a n d
(5) respectively, to their equilibrium value depending onlyo nφ  and parameters. These equations
reﬂect entry conditions: expected entry costs paid by projects or by banks on ﬁnancial markets,
over and above the costs of hiring labor, have to be equal to thep r o p e r l yd i s c o u n t e dv a l u eo f
payoffs received by the different sides of the market.
We can combine them to obtain a single market equation, denoted by (CC), for equilibrium























where Sg,t = Eg,t +Bg,t is the joint value of an employed worker to an investment project and
ab a n k . W ep r e f e re q u a t i o n( C C )t od e s c r i b eaj o bc r e a t i o nc o n dition for this double matching
economy because it naturally leads to the main intuition of our subsequent results and has a ready
interpretation. The left-hand side is the total amount of search costs in ﬁnancial markets, which we
denote by








from the production process, net of hiring costs. With free entry in the labor market, as in the
standard search and matching model, the bracketed term on ther i g h th a n ds i d ei sd r i v e nt oz e r o .
In this sense credit market frictions drive a wedge between the labor recruiting costs γ/q(θ) and
the discount value of a ﬁlled vacancy to the ﬁrm.
We can reorganize the terms in equation (CC) by replacing the expected value of the surplus
7by a function of labor market tightness (see Appendix A.2) ando b t a i nat r a d i t i o n a ld y n a m i cj o b


























are vacancy costs augmented for frictional credit markets.
It is worth noting two special cases. First, when r = 0,Γt is simply the sum of all search costs









The presence of frictional credit markets adds a new component to the costs of creating a job for
ﬁrms that, in the special case r = 0, is independent of labor market tightness. Concurring with
an insight already brought by Pissarides (2009), the economyw i l lb em o r ev o l a t i l ea st o t a lj o b
creation costs are less procyclical than if credit market imperfections were absent.6
The second special case corresponds to perfect credit markets, that is, when K(φ )=0: in this
















t is equilibrium labor market tightness in the credit frictionless world of Pissarides (1985).
Thus, compared to the world with perfect credit markets, frictional credit markets impose a lower
limit on the value of a job vacancy to a ﬁrm. In particular, we can establish that in steady state
θ  < θP,a sw a ss h o w ni nW a s m e ra n dW e i l( 2 0 0 4 )a n da r i s e si nP e t r o s k y -Nadeau (2009).
The ﬂow repayment to the bank, Ψt,w h i c hw ed e r i v en e x t ,v a r i e sw i t ht h es t a t eo ft h el a b o r
market and productivity at the time of the meeting. The value is solved using equation (7), where
the values of the ﬁrm and the bank are replaced by their forwardv a l u e s( 2 ) ,( 3 ) ,( 5 )a n d( 6 ) .W e
6As t a t e di nP i s s a r i d e s( 2 0 0 9 ,p a g e1 3 4 1 ):“ ( . . . )as i m p l er e m o d e l i n go ft h e[ m a t c h i n g ]c o s t sf r o mp r o p o r t i o n al
to partly ﬁxed and partly proportional can increase the volatility of tightness and job ﬁnding, virtually matching the
observed magnitudes, without violating wage ﬂexibility.”
8obtain, after some steps exposed in Appendix A.3 and substituting in the job creation condition
(10),7













This equation shows that the expected repayment is equal to the total expected gross proﬁts minus
ap a r to ft h ee n t r yc o s t sK(φ ).A h i g h e r b a r g a i n i n g s h a r e o f t h e b a n k β raises the expected
repayment.8
3V o l a t i l i t y a n d C o n s t r a i n e d E f ﬁ c i e n c y
We begin by illustrating the source of ampliﬁcation in a simplesetting with exogenouswages. This
allows us to focus on the contribution of frictional credit markets by deriving a ﬁnancial multiplier
that is directly linked to the total cost of transactions on credit markets. The magnitude of this
ﬁnancial multiplier can then be related to deviations from a credit market Hosios-Pissarides con-
strained efﬁciency rule. Finally, we derive the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity
shocks for a model with endogenous wages.
3.1 Elasticity of θt to Productivity Shocks Under Fixed Wages
Assuming wages are exogenously ﬁxed at wt =w,al o g - l i n e a ra p p r o x i m a t i o no fe q u a t i o n( 1 0 )
around a steady state allows us to express deviations in laborm a r k e tt i g h t n e s sas follows (the
derivation of this and the subsequent expressions of this section are available in the Appendix):
















where “hatted” variables denoteproportional deviationsfrom the steady state, and η is the absolute
value of the elasticity of q(θt)t oθt.T h eﬁ r s tc o m p o n e n t1
η of this elasticity is the ampliﬁcation
due to the existence of search frictions in the labor market. The second component
y
y    w is the gap
between wages and the marginal product of labor. Under the “small labor surplus” assumption,
the smaller the gap, the more responsive job creation is to productivity shocks. Finally, the third








8The second term in brackets is always positive with our parameter values (Section 4). It is positive in a neighbor-
hood of r = 0o ri nt h en e i g h b o r h o o do ft h es t e a d y - s t a t e .
9component
Sg
Sg K(φ ) is the ﬁnancial multiplier. The multiplier, as we will discuss, is related to the
size of the ﬁrm surplus to opening a job vacancy, Sg K(φ ),as m a l l e rs u r p l u sl e a d i n gt og r e a t e r
responses of labor market tightness to changes in productivity.
Let us proceed further in deriving the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks
both in the absence and presence of ﬁnancial imperfections. In the absence of credit market fric-
tions, the job creation condition in equation (13) means thatd e v i a t i o n si nl a b o rm a r k e tt i g h t n e s s
appear as the discounted sum of deviations in future expectedl a b o rp r o d u c t i v i t y .After interme-
diate steps, it follows that the elasticity of labor market tightness to a productivity shock in the
Pissarides world with a ﬁxed wage, denoted ΛP,i s 9
ΛP =









By the same steps, the elasticity of labor market tightness int h ep r e s e n c eo fc r e d i tf r i c t i o n s ,Λ,i s
given by
Λ =





η ˜ γ(r)[(1+r) (1 s)ρy]
(16)






> ˜ γ(0)=γ is a measure of total frictional costs in both credit and
labor markets. Consequently, the ﬁnancial multiplier, or the increment in the responsiveness of
labor market tightness to a productivity shock from the introduction of frictional credit markets in
this dynamic setting can be deﬁned as the ratio of these two quantities:
MD






When r goes to zero this formula is the same as the multiplier identiﬁed in Wasmer and Weil
(2004). This multiplier is increasing in the gap between equilibrium labor market tightness with
frictional credit markets θ  and θP obtained without credit frictions. In other words, the ﬁnancial
multiplier is a function of the distortions induced by frictional credit markets.10











(ˆ yt+1+i).G i v e n t h ea s s u m p t i o n t h a tp r o d u c t i v i t y f o l l o w s a nA R ( 1 ) p r ocess,








y νt. The approach we follow here, examining the response of
an endogenousvariableto exogenousinnovations,is frequentlyemployedin the businesscycleliterature. Forinstance,
Dotsey and King (2006) use the similar log-linear approximations and transformations to express the impact response
of aggregate output to a monetary policy shock.
10Given that q(θ )/q(θP) is above 1 but that ˜ γ(0)/˜ γ(r) may be below 1, there is a theoretical possibility that, far
away from r = 0, the multiplier is actually smaller than 1. However, in a neighborhood of r = 0t h i sd o e sn o th a p p e n
103.2 A Hosios-Pissarides Condition for the Credit Market
Frictions in the credit market lead to inefﬁciencies. In the labor literature, a second best efﬁciency
condition has been derived by Hosios (1990) and Pissarides (1990). In short, this condition states
that, when the bargaining share of one side equals its elasticity in the matching function, agents’
entry decision internalize the congestion externality theyc r e a t eo n t ot h eo t h e ra g e n t s .As i m i l a r
rule will be shown here for the credit market. Further, minimizing this distortion, that is, reaching
the constrained efﬁcient allocation, also minimizes the ﬁnancial multiplier MD
f .W eﬁ r s tc a l c u l a t e
the constrained efﬁciency condition for ﬁnancial markets inas e a r c he c o n o m y .
The social welfare function at time t is a discounted sum of output in all future periods t +i,
i = 0,1,..., added to value of non-employment utility denoted by z,n e to fa l ls e a r c hc o s t sf o rl a b o r









[yt+i(1 ut+i)+zut+i γθt+iut+i κBt+i eEt+i]
where θtut = Vt is the number of ﬁrms prospecting in the labor market. The masso fp r o s p e c t -
ing banks and projects in the credit market (B and E)c a nb ed e t e r m i n e df r o md e ﬁ n i n gp e r i o d
vacancies as unﬁlled preceding period vacancies and new entries from the credit market:
Vt = Vt 1(1 q(θt 1))+Etp(φt)=Vt 1(1 q(θt 1))+Btφtp(φt)
Consequently, the social planner’s program can be expresseda s :
max
{ut,θt,φt}













(θt+iut+i (1 q(θt+i 1))θt+i 1ut+i 1)]
s.t. ut+i+1 = ut+i(1 θt+iq(θt+i))+(1 ut+i)s
and is therefore separable in φt on the one hand, and in labor market variables ut,θt on the other.11
The optimal choice of φt amounts to minimizing total search costs in the credit market K(φt)=
and in all our calibrations it will always be above 2.
11Thisisbecausetheterminφ, κ
φt+ip(φt+i) + e
p(φt+i),m u s tb em i n i m i z e di no r d e ro b t a i nt h em a x i m a lv a l u eo fΩt,s i n c e
whatever the value of θ and u the next term is positive in the steady-state. For this term tob en e g a t i v e ,i m p l a u s i b l y















where ε =  φp (φ)/p(φ) is the elasticity of the ﬁnding rate of new projects on credit markets.
Hence, since ∂2
∂φ2K(φ) > 0, the socially optimal value of credit market tightness is the one that
minimizes search costs on credit markets. The Hosios-Pissarides rule, which states that there is
av a l u eo ft h eb a r g a i n i n gp a r a m e t e ro v e rΨ that internalizes the matching externalities due to the
search frictions, applies here: φ  = φopt   β = ε. This is the Hosios-Pissarides condition in the
credit market. 12
The next step is to recall that the dynamic ﬁnancial multiplier MD
f increases in the gap be-
tween θ  and θP,i t s e l fi n c r e a s i n gi nt h ec o s t so fﬁ n a n c i a li n t e r m e d i a t i o nK(φ ).T h e s e c o s t s
are minimized for any φ  at the Hosios-Pissarides condition in the credit market. Therefore, the
Hosios-Pissarides condition also minimizes the volatilityi n d u c e db yﬁ n a n c i a lf r i c t i o n s .T h ec a l -
ibration in Wasmer and Weil (2004), by setting β = ε,t h u si m p l i e dam i n i m i z e ds t a t i cﬁ n a n c i a l
multiplier of MS
f = 1.74 . Away from this parameterization, one has a larger ﬁnancial multiplier.
We summarize this in a Proposition.
Proposition. The ﬁnancial multiplier is minimized at β = ε and can be arbitrarily large: as
the value of β reaches either 0 or 1, the multiplier tends towards inﬁnity.
This is a variant of the “small surplus” assumption. When one side receives an arbitrarily
small surplus, the economy becomes inﬁnitely reactive to small shocks given the complementarity
between banks and projects in the matching function. Figure 1p r o v i d e sag r a p h i ci l l u s t r a t i o n
of this result in which the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks increases
12Another interpretation is as follows: one can verify that theH o s i o s - P i s s a r i d e sc o n d i t i o ni st h eo n et h a tm i n i m i z e s
entry costs in the credit market with respect to the bargaining power (and not with respect to φ as above). To do
so, recall that the left-hand side of job creation condition (CC) is a function of β and ε denoted by K(β,ε).A st h e
right-hand side is increasing in θ it is enough to show that K(β,ε) is minimized in β = ε.B e f o r ed o i n gs o ,w ec a n
use two intermediate steps. First, note that K(β,ε)=
e
p(φ )
1 β from equation (EE) divided by (1 β).S e c o n d ,w eh a v e
∂φ 












(1 β)2 = 0   ε = β.























































Figure 1: HOSIOS-PISSARIDES IN THE CREDIT MARKET AND THE FINANCIAL MULTIPLIER
symmetrically as the bargaining weight β deviates from the elasticity of the matching function ε,
set here to 0.5.13
3.3 Elasticity of θt to Productivity Shocks Under Endogenous Wages
We now extend our results to a setting with endogenous wages, assuming that the wage is deter-
mined by bargaining between a worker and a ﬁrm. Since we deﬁne the ﬁrm as the investment
project-banker block, the bank is not excluded from the wage negotiations.14




Et [f(θt)Wt+1+(1  f(θt))Ut+1]




where z is the value of non-employment activities and f(θ)=θq(θ) the job ﬁnding rate. The
13Figure 1 is providedfora set of parametersthat we discuss below and the assumption of a ﬁxed wage. The general
shape of the elasticity of the v-u ratio to productivity shocks as the credit market parameters β and ε deviate from the
Hosios-Pissarides condition does not depend on the speciﬁc parameterization.
14There are two inter-related reasons for this choice. The ﬁrsto n ei st h a tt h ea l t e r n a t i v el e a d st oc o m p l e xs t r a t e g i c
interactions illustrated in Wasmer and Weil (2004): the ﬁrm and the bank wish to raise the debt of the ﬁrm above
what is needed in order to reduce the size of total surplus to bes h a r e db e t w e e nt h eﬁ r ma n dt h ew o r k e ra tal a t e r
time. Hence, wages are driven down to the reservation wage of workers and do not vary with the ﬁrm’s productivity,
which is counterfactual. This leads to the second reason, which is that we want our endogenous wage extension to be
comparable to the classical wage solution in the labor searchl i t e r a t u r ei no r d e rt oc o m p a r et h ev o l a t i l i t yi nt h em o d e l
to other elasticities found in the literature.
13wage is the solution to
argmax(Wt  Ut)α(Sg,t)1 α
Beginning with an environment without credit frictions, theo u t c o m eo fN a s hb a r g a i n i n go v e rt h e








+(1 α)z,w h e r eα   (0,1) is
the bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis the ﬁrm and the superscript (P,nb) refer the to credit
frictionless environment with Nash bargained wages. Introducing this wage rule in our earlier
derivationsand relatingmovementsinlabormarket tightnessto expecteddeviationsofproductivity
from trend, yields an elasticity of labor market tightness top r o d u c t i v i t ys h o c k sg i v e nb y 15
ΛP,nb =












Compared to the elasticity when wages are ﬁxed in (15), only a share (1 α) of the rise in pro-
ductivity accrues to the ﬁrm. In addition, the rise in equilibrium labor market tightness following a
positive productivity shock improves the outside option of the worker and his bargaining position
in wage determination. This appears in the denominator as thet e r mα f(θP,nb), further reducing
the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks.
Turning now to the case of frictional credit markets, the worker-ﬁrm negotiated wage must















are the set-up costs augmented for frictional credit markets.
With r =0, thisterm becomes γ+q(θ
 ,nb
t )K(φ ) .T h e r e f o r e ,a sc o m p a r e dt oaP i s s a r i d e se c o n o m y
where wages depend linearly on labor market tightness with a term in γθ,w a g e sn o wh a v ea




t )K(φ ).A ni n c r e a s ei nl a b o rm a r k e tt i g h t n e s si m p r o v e st h e
worker’s bargaining position in wage negotiations by weakening the value of the ﬁrm’s outside








Θi  yt+1+i where the second






η(1+r) reﬂects the share of the change in productivity accruing to the worker through the
wage. As a comparison, note that if ρy = 1t h i si st h ee l a s t i c i t yo b t a i n e dw h e nc o m p a r i n gs t e a d ys t a t es, or to a







14option over and above the recruiting costs γ. Thus, as compared to the ﬁxed wage model, the
endogenouswage modelwill generate a lower volatilityof hiring decisions. However, as compared
to the endogenous wage economy without ﬁnancial market imperfections, this economy will have
at e n d e n c yt oh a v em o r ev o l a t i l ew a g e s .H o w e v e rt h em a i nc h a n nel discussed in introduction, the
fact that entry costs are less procyclical, will undo this wage volatility effect and our calibration
will show higher elasticities for the model with ﬁnancial market imperfections.
Finally, the elasticity of labor market tightness to a productivity shock under frictional credit
markets and with an endogenous wage is:
Λnb =






η ˜ γ(r)(1+r) 
 




where   κ   K(φ )
q(θ ,nb)
1+r .C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e d y n a m i c ﬁ n a n c i a l m u l t i p l i e r w h e n t h e w a ge is en-







  ηγ γρy
 
η(1 s) α f(θP,nb)
 
η ˜ γ(r)  ˜ γ(r)ρy
 






Just as in the previous case with a ﬁxed wage, the ﬁnancial multiplier tends to 1 as costs on credit
markets, K(φ ),t e n dt o w a r dz e r o .
4 Parameterization
In this section, we pursue the objective of providinga set of parameters to illustratethe main points
above. Our goal is therefore not to “calibrate” an economy, but rather to ﬁnd a way of generating
key parameter values and illustrate their impact on the volatility generated by the model. We begin
detailing thedeterminationof standard parameters before discussingourapproach to pinningdown
values for parameters of the credit market.
The basic unit of time is a quarter. The matching function in the labor market is assumed to
take the usual form Ml(V ,u)=χV 1 ηuη,w h e r eχ > 0i sal e v e lp a r a m e t e r . W es e tη = 0.5,
drawing on the survey of estimates of the labor matching function in Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001). The level parameter χ is pinned down by targeting a steady state rate of unemployment of
158%, given that we set the job separation rate, s,t o0 .06. This corresponds to the value reported in
Davis et al. (2006). Silva and Toledo (2007) calculate the cost of recruiting a worker to represent
approximately 3% of wage of a new hire. In the model, this corresponds to V  γ/(w(1 u)).
Since we target an unemployment rate, know the job ﬁnding ratef r o mf = s(1 u)/u,a n dh e n c e
labor market tightness,the only remaining element in the expression is the unit cost γ.I nt h a ts e n s e
theinformationfrom Silvaand Toledoisused toconstrainthev a lueofγ.F i n a l l y ,w et a r g e tas t e a d y
state wage to productivity ratio of three quarters in order toa v o i dp l a c i n gt h em o d e li nar e g i o n
of the parameter space where ampliﬁcation of labor market tightness arises from having assumed
as m a l ll a b o rs u r p l u s . 16 By setting the ﬂow utility from non-employment to 0.4, as in Shimer
(2005), this pins down the value of the worker’s bargaining weight α.F i n a l l y , t h e m a g n i t u d e
of the response of labor market tightness to a productivity shock depends on the persistence of
the process for labor productivity (see Section 3). We draw from the existing literature and set
the persistence coefﬁcient ρy to 0.95 (see, Merz, 1995, Andolfatto, 1996, Den Haan, Ramey and
Watson, 2000, Gertler and Trigari, 2007, among others). The risk free rate is set to 4% annually,
corresponding to a 3-month U.S. treasury bill.
The speciﬁcation of the credit market requires choosing parameters of the credit matching
function, assumed to be of the form Mc(B,E)=ςE 1 εBε,w i t hς > 0a n d0< ε < 1, the costs
of prospecting on credit markets, κ and e,a n dt h eb a r g a i n i n gw e i g h tβ. In order to determine
plausible values for these parameters and investigate the magnitude of the ﬁnancial multiplier, we
begin by imposing the Hosios condition in the credit market that minimizes the magnitude of the
ﬁnancial multiplier, setting β = ε = 0.5. For lack of direct evidence on the effort cost e,w es e t
κ = e,a n da l l o wt h el a t t e ra n dt h el e v e lp a r a m e t e ri nt h ec r e d i tm a tching function ς to adjust in
order to match the ﬁnancial sector’s share of GDP. Theoretically, the share of the ﬁnancial sector
in value added is
Σ =
(1 u)Ψ V γ  Bκ
1 u
(21)
where the ﬁrst term in the numerator represents total bank gross proﬁts, i.e. Ψ times the number of
16First, since revenues are shared between banks, ﬁrms and workers, the model is richer than a simple worker-ﬁrm
model. Reimbursement to banks is a proxy for the cost of accessing capital. We aim for wages at three quarters of
productivityin orderto avoid anyampliﬁcationarising fromas malllabors urplus .Theremaining25%gototheo wner
of the illiquid and liquid capital, i.e., the ﬁrm and the banker. We think of the ﬁrm and bankeras being the joint owners
of installed capital that can produce a good with a unit of labor.
16banks in the proﬁt state, which is the number of producing ﬁrms1 u;t h es e c o n dt e r mr e p r e s e n t s
the negativecash ﬂows of banks ﬁnancing vacancies times the number of job vacancies V ;a n dt h e
last term represents the costs of ﬁnancial intermediation paid by banks. Note that we assumed the
costs e paid by entrepreneurs don’t enter GDP as they are effort costs. The denominator is total
production at y = 1. We calculate the ﬁnancial sector’s value added as a share of United States
GDP using the industry value added tables provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (see the
Appendix). Over the period 1947-2009, this represents approximately 3.0% of GDP and will be
the target for Σ.
We obtain the combination of credit market parameters that delivers the targeted share Σ by
aﬂ e x i b l ea n dt r a n s p a r e n tp a r a m e t e r i z a t i o nm e t h o d . T h i sm e thod is a variant of the “method of
simulated annealing” that we detail in the Appendix.17 However, this initial parameterization
results in a share of the ﬁnancial sector in GDP, Σ,b e l o wi t se m p i r i c a lm e a s u r e .W et h e r e f o rr e l a x
the Hosios condition in the credit market such that we achieveb o t hat a r g e ts h a r eo ft h eﬁ n a n c i a l
sector and limit the duration of search for investment projects to approximately 5 quarters. The
results are reported in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 1.
The second Step of the numerical exercise provides examples of parameter values that generate
an elasticity of labor market tightness to productivityshocks, Λ,o f ,r e s p e c t i v e l y ,7 ,1 5a n d2 0 .T h i s
is achieved by allowing the bargaining weight β and elasticity ε to deviate further away from the
creditmarket Hosioscondition. Theﬁrst elasticitycorrespondstothevaluesuggestedby Pissarides
(2009), whilethe remainingallowus toillustratethe potentialmagnitudeoftheﬁnancial multiplier.
In addition, we show that the model has the appealing feature of being able to attain an elasticity
of 20 without making the small labor surplus assumption.
17The method of simulated annealing is inspired by the way materials are heated and cooled to increase the size of
their crystals. Each cycle generates a perturbation of the initial system and leads to a more stable state. This is the
same generic principle here: perturb parameters of a complexs y s t e mi ne q u i l i b r i u mi no r d e rt om i n i m i z eac r i t e r i o n ,
in our case the distance to our calibrating target Σ.
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5.1 Endogenous Wage
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values for each step of the numerical procedure. It also presents
thesteadystatevaluesofaseriesofendogenousquantities.D u r i n gt h eﬁ r s ts t e p ,m a t c h i n gt h es h a r e
of the ﬁnancial sector, the values of the credit matching function’s elasticity ε and the bargain-
ing weight β diverge away from the Hosios-Pissarides condition: the matching elasticity remains
around 0.5 while the bank’s bargaining weight β increases to 0.68. The remaining parameters
included in the numerical procedure change very little.
In Step 1, when we match the value of Σ, the ﬁnancial multiplieris MD
f =2.30 and theelasticity
of labor market tightness to productivity shocks is 4.47, below the value advocated by Pissarides
(2009). We thus proceed to the second step in this illustrative numerical exercise that aims at
raising the value of this elasticity, maintaining the previous constraints. We reach the values 7, 15
and 20 and report the corresponding parameter values in, respectively, columns labeled 2a, 2b and
2c. The ﬁnancial multiplier, in the last case, reaches a factor of 6.05.
What we learn from this second step is that the calibrated economy deviates marginally more
away from Hosios-Pissarides to generate these large degreeso fa m p l i ﬁ c a t i o n :β reaches 0.92 and
ε is still approximately 0.5. Most other parameter values remain stable. In particular, the value of
the bargaining parameter of workers α remains at 0.10, a value that is in line with recent papers,
when we target the elasticity of labor market tightness suggested by Pissarides (2009).18
The ﬂow value of non-employment, z,n e c e s s a r yf o rt h em o d e lt oi m p l ya ne l a s t i c i t yo fl a b o r
market tightness to productivity shocks of 7 increases from 0.4 to 0.48. In order to reach the
elasticity suggested by Shimer (2005), z increases to 0.67, from which we draw two conclusions.
First, reducing the size of the labor surplus remains an important element in ampliﬁcation. Second,
there is a feedback from the size of the labor surplus to the ﬁnancial multiplier, reﬂecting the
feedback from labor to credit markets. That is, the elasticity Λ to z is increasing in the degree of
credit market friction.
Finally, we calculate the elasticity of unemployment to changes in unemployment beneﬁts.
18Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006)ﬁnd a bargainingpower of low skilled workersin thisrange, and Delacroix
(2006) imposes a value of 6 to 8% to replicate the union premium.




Initial Step1 Step 2a Step2b Step 2c
Labor market
job separation rate s 0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06 
matching elasticity η 0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
value of leisure z 0.4  0.4  0.48 0.64 0.67
worker’s share α 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.03
vacancy cost γ 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
matching level param. χ 0.37 0.38 0.673 0.68 0.79
Credit market
bank’s barg. weight β 0.5 0.68 0.88 0.91 0.92
matching elasticity ε 0.5 0.5 0.55 0.55 0.48
matching level param. ς 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.045 0.049
bank search costs κ 0.08 0.068 0.074 0.049 0.044
project search costs e 0.08 0.068 0.074 0.049 0.44
Steady state values
w/y 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Unemp. rate 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
Average recruiting cost 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Credit market share Σ 2.4% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Duration, search for credit 19.2 13.87 5.5 6.25 6.40
Financial multiplier and elasticities
Financial multiplier: MD
f 2.26 2.30 2.86 4.95 6.05
Elasticity of θ to productivity shock: Λ 4.41 4.47 7 15 20
Elasticity of u to z 1.63 5.10 7.22
Notes: ( ) indicates a parameter remaining ﬁxed. Column Step 1 refers tot h eo u t c o m e so fm a t c h i n gt h e
share of the ﬁnancial sector in GDP; Step 2 to the outcomes of matching various targets for the elasticity of
θ to productivity shocks. The Costain-Reiter elasticity of u to z with Hagedorn-Manovskiiparameters is 14.3.
19Costain and Reiter (2008) found this elasticity to be much tool a r g e ,a r o u n d1 4 . 3 ,f o rt h ep a r a m e t e r
values implied by Hagedorn and Manovskii’s (2008) calibration. This led to the criticism that it is
difﬁcult to match both the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity and the elasticity of
unemployment to policy parameters such as the replacement ratio. By contrast, at an elasticity of
labor market tightness to productivity shocks of 20, the model’s elasticity of unemployment to the
policy parameter z is only 7.2 instead of 14.3.
For the reasons exposed in the last two paragraphs, our preferred speciﬁcation is in Column
3( S t e p2 a ) :t h i ss e to fp a r a m e t e r sa l l o w su st or e a c ha ne l a s t icity of labor market tightness to
productivity close to the value advocated in Pissarides (2009), namely 7.56, while keeping a low
value for the elasticity of unemployment to unemployment insurance (1.6), maintaining the value
of leisure low relative to the wage, and a moderate duration ofc r e d i ts e a r c h .
5.2 Fixed Wage
Table 2 of the Appendix summarizes the results from the equivalent procedures assuming a ﬁxed
wage. Again, the values of the credit matching function’s elasticity ε and the bargaining weight
β diverge away from Hosios-Pissarides, and the bank bargaining weight β increases to 0.85. The
value of Σ is matched, the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity innovations is 19.5
and the ﬁnancial multiplier 3.07. The second step of the illustrativenumerical exercise that aims at
raisingthe valueof the elasticityof labor market tightnessto20,resultsinaﬁnancialmultiplierthat
reaches 3.64. The parameters deviate marginally more from the credit market Hosios-Pissarides
condition in the credit market: β reaches 0.86 and ε is lower, at 0.51.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Financial imperfections raise the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks by a
factor MD
f called the ﬁnancial multiplier. It is possible to generate a plausibly large elasticity of
labor market tightness to productivity shocks without relying on the small labor surplus assump-
tion, even with endogenous wages, if one relaxes the Hosios-Pissarides rule in the credit market.
Under the assumption of a large enough difference between theb a r g a i n i n gp o w e ro fb a n k sv i s -
à-vis ﬁrms (β)w i t ht h ee l a s t i c i t yo ft h er a t ea tw h i c hn e wp r o j e c t sm e e tb a n k e r sw i t hr e s p e c tt o
20credit market tightness (ε), one can obtain an elasticity around 20 or even larger. Our results are in
fact a generalization of the “small labor surplus” assumption: when the credit market is either very
tight or very slack for ﬁrms, one side of the market has a very small total surplus to entering the
relationship. Consequently, the entry of that side of the credit market is restricted and even small
productivity shocks can generate large relative increases in the number of agents on the restricted
side of the market. Here, the small surplus is on ﬁrms in the credit-prospecting stage.
Theﬁnancialsectorintroducesanewelementtohiringcoststhatarenotproportionaltothepro-
cyclical average duration of ﬁlling a vacancy. This is consistent with Pissarides (2009) who pleads
in favor of adding a non-proportional part to hiring costs as am e a n so fg e n e r a t i n ga m p l i ﬁ c a t i o ni n
thisclassofmodels. Ourpaperthusprovidesaninterpretationofthisﬁxedpart inentrycostslinked
to ﬁnancial market imperfections.Our conclusion is that macroeconomic modeling is improved,
both qualitatively and quantitatively, with the introduction of ﬁnancial market imperfections and
our model is a step in this direction.
21References
[1] Andolfatto, D., 1996. Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search. American Eco-
nomic Review 86(1), 112-132.
[2] Benmelech, E., Bergman, N. and A. Seru. 2011, Financing Labor. NBER working
paper 17144.
[3] Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., 1989.Agency Costs, Net Worth and Business Fluctua-
tions. American Economic Review 79(1), 14-31.
[4] Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., 1995.Inside the Black Box: TheC r e d i tC h a n n e lo fM o n -
etary Policy Transmission. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(4), 27-48.
[5] Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., Gilchrist, S., 1996. The Financial Accelerator and the
Flight to Quality. The Review of Economics and Statistics 78(1), 1-15.
[6] Caggese, Andrea and Viente Cunat. 2008. Financing Constraints and Fixed-Term
Employment Contracts. The Economic Journal 118, pp. 2012–2046,
[7] Cahuc, P., Postel-Vinay, F., Robin, J.M., 2006. Wage Bargaining with On-the-job
Search: Theory and Evidence. Econometrica 74(2), 323-364.
[8] Cole, H., Rogerson, R., 1999. Can the Mortensen-Pissarides Matching Model Match
the Business-Cycle Facts?, International Economic Review 40(4), 933-59.
[9] Costain, J. and M. Reiter, 2008. Business Cycles, unemployment insurance and the
calibration of matching models. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 32(4)
1120-1155.
[10] Davis, S., Faberman, J., Haltiwanger, J., 2006. The FlowA p p r o a c ht oL a b o rM a r -
kets: New Data and Micro-Macro Links. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(3),
3-26
[11] Delacroix, A., 2006. A Multisectorial Matching Model ofU n i o n s .J o u r n a lo fM o n e -
tary Economics 53(3), 573-596.
22[12] Den Haan, W. J., Garey R., and J. Watson, 2000. Job Destruction and Propagation of
Shocks. American Economic Review 90, 482–498.
[13] Dotsey, M. and R. King, 2006. Pricing, Production and Persistence. Journal of the
European Economic Association 4(5), 893–928.
[14] Gertler, M., and A. Trigari, 2009. Unemployment Fluctuations with Staggered Nash
Wage Bargaining. Journal of Political Economy 117, 38–86
[15] Hall, R., 2005. Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness. Amer-
ican Economic Review 95(1), 50-65.
[16] Hagedorn, M., Manovskii, I., 2008. The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unem-
ployment and Vacancies Revisited. American Economic Review9 8 ( 4 ) ,1 6 9 2 - 1 7 0 6 .
[17] Hosios, A. , 1990. On the Efﬁciency of Matching and Related Models of Search and
Unemployment. The Review of Economic Studies 57(2), 279-298.
[18] Kiyotaki, N., Moore, J., 1997. Credit Cycles. Journal ofP o l i t i c a lE c o n o m y1 0 5 ( 2 ) ,
211-248.
[19] Merz, M., 1995. Search in the Labor Market and the Real Business Cycle. Journal
of Monetary Economics 36(2), 269-300.
[20] Mortensen, D., Nagypal, E., 2007. More on Unemployment and Vacancy Fluctua-
tions. Review of Economic Dynamics 10, 327-347.
[21] Mortensen, D., Pissarides, C., 1994. Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory
of Unemployment. Review of Economic Studies, 61(3), 397-415.
[22] Nicoletti, G. and O. Pierrard, 2006. Capital Market Frictions and the Business Cycle.
Universite Catholique de Louvain discussion paper 2006053.
[23] Petrongolo, B., Pissarides, C., 2001. Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the
Matching Function. Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2), 390-431.
23[24] Petrosky-Nadeau, N., 2009. Credit, Vacancies and Unemployment Fluctuations.
Carnegie Mellon University working paper 2009-E27.
[25] Pissarides, C., 1985.Short-runEquilibriumDynamicsofUnemployment,Vacancies,
and Real Wages., American Economic Review 75(4), 676-90.
[26] Pissarides, C., 1990. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
[27] Pissarides, C., 2009. The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness the
Answer? Econometrica 77( 5), 1339–1369.
[28] Sharpe, Steven. 1994. Financial Market Imperfections,F i r mL e v e r a g e ,a n dt h e
Cyclicality of Employment. American Economic Review 84(4),p p .1 0 6 0 – 1 0 7 4 .
[29] Silva, J., Toledo, M., 2007. Labor Turnover Costs and theC y c l i c a lB e h a v i o ro fV a -
cancies and Unemployment. Macroeconomic Dynamics 13(1), 76-96.
[30] Shimer, R., 2005. The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacan-
cies. American Economic Review 95(1), 25-49.
[31] Wasmer, E., Weil, P., 2004. The Macroeconomics of Credita n dL a b o rM a r k e tI m -
perfections. American Economic Review 94(4), 944-963.
24Appendix: The Cyclical Volatility of Labor Markets
under Frictional Financial Markets
Not for Publication
AI n t r o d u c t i o n
This appendix details the derivation of the various equations and elasticities presented in the main
text.
A.1 Credit Market Tightness
Free entry on both sides of the credit market, along with Nash bargaining over the surplus of a
credit relationship, results in a time invariant credit market tightness. To show this, note ﬁrst that




;a n dEl,t =
e
p(φt)
Denoting the banker’s bargaining weight by β   (0,1),d e ﬁ n i n gt h ec r e d i tr e l a t i o n s h i ps u r p l u sa s










A.2 Deriving a Job Creation Condition:
It will be convenient at this stage to express the joint value of recruiting a worker to a banker and





































































, we obtain a job creation condition in the presence of fric-













This section provides the details in deriving the rental rate Ψ.T h es h a r i n g r u l eu n d e rN a s hb a r -




















































































































































A.4 Workers and Wages
We assume that the wage is negotiated between a worker-ﬁrm pair, withsurplusSL
t =Sg,t+Wt Ut,
and satisﬁes the sharing rule αSg,t =( 1 α)(Wt  Ut),w h e r eα   (0,1) is the Nash bargaining
weight of workers. Applying this sharing rule to the worker-ﬁrm surplus, ﬁrst we have
SL







Et [(1 s)Wt+1+sUt+1] z 
1
1+r
Et [θtqtWt+1 (1 θtqt)Ut+1]
SL

























yt  wt +(1 s)
1
1+r
EtSg,t+1 =( 1 α)
 







Rearranging terms yields the wage rule under frictional labor and credit markets:
wt = α(yt +θtΓt)+(1 α)z
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Shock
B.1 Derivation of Expression for ˆ θt in Section 3.1
This section details the steps in deriving the following expression for proportional deviations of
labor market tightness from the deterministic steady state,a s s u m i n gaﬁ x e dw a g e   w:
















where “hatted” variables denote proportional deviations from the steady state, and η is the elastic-
ity of q(θt)t oθt.











t ,al o g - l i n e a ra p p r o x i m a t i o no ft h i se q u a t i o n








































Since we have, in a steady state, that Γ
q(θ) = 1



















The ﬁnal step involves developing the expression for Et ˆ Sg,t+1.T h ev a l u eo faﬁ l l e dv a c a n c yt oa
28ﬁrm, assuming a ﬁxed wage, is given by







Al o g - l i n e a ra p p r o x i m a t i o no ft h i se q u a t i o ny i e l d s :







































Substituting this expression in the previous one for the proportional deviation in labor market



















B.2 Elasticity of Labor Market Tightness

































29Makinguseofaforwardoperator,xt+1 =L 1xt,w eh a v eth a t
 
1  1 s
1+rEtL 1    θP
t =
q(θP)Π
ηγ (1+r)Et   Πt+1














B.2.1 Fixed Wage - Pissarides
Under the assumption of a ﬁxed wage wt =   w,p r o p o r t i o n a ld e v i a t i o ni np r o ﬁ t sa r ee q u a lt o ˆ Πt =

























It followsthat the elasticityof labor market tightnessto a productivityshock in thePissarides world
with a ﬁxed wage, denoted ΛP,i s
ΛP =








B.2.2 Fixed Wage - Financial Friction



















t .T a k i n gt h el o g - l i n e a rd e v i a t i o n s



















Calling ˜ γ(r)  
 
γ +K(φ )( r
1+r)
 
with ˜ γ(0)=γ,w eh a v e
  θt =
q(θ)





30Making use of the forward operator, we have that
 
1  1 s
1+rEtL 1   θt =
q(θ)
η ˜ γ(r) (1+r)Et  yt+1,a n dc a n
express the current deviations of labor market tightness as the discounted expected future path of
productivity:
  θt =
q(θ)










If productivity follows the same AR(1) process, then   θt =
q(θ)








y νt,o r  θt =
q(θ)






νt and the expression for the elasticity of labor market tightness to produc-
tivity shocks under frictional credit markets and a ﬁxed wagei s :




η ˜ γ(r) [(1+r) (1 s)]ρy
B.2.3 Flexible Wage - Pissarides
Using the deﬁnition of the wage wt =α (yt +γθt)+(1 α)z we can further express the deviations

















η(1+r) .A s s u m i n g t h a t p r o d u c t i v i t y f o l l o w s a n A R ( 1 ) w i t h p e r s i s t e nce




















ρyνt,a n dt h ee l a s t i c i t yo fl a b o rm a r k e tt i g h t n e s st op r o d u c t i v -
ity shocks is






ηγ (1+r) γ  
 
η(1 s) α f(θP,nb)
 
ρy
31B.2.4 Flexible Wage - Financial Friction


























t ) such that the
job creation condition is expressed as a function of labor market tightness and productivity. Then,
we take the log-linear deviations of the job creation condition around a stationary steady state:
η(1+r)
q(θ)
˜ γ(r)  θ
 ,nb















































1+r (1 η)f(θ ,nb)
  
for the moment, we then
follow similar steps by ﬁrst obtaining deviations of labor market tightness as a discounted sum of






























νt and the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity
shocks is:






η ˜ γ(r) (1+r) 
 
η ˜ γ(r) (1+s) α f(θ ,nb)(˜ γ(r)+(1 η)  κ)
 
ρy
where   κ   K(φ )
q(θ ,nb)
1+r .
32CN u m e r i c a l E x e r c i s e
C.1 Data
In order to calculate the ﬁnancial sector’s share of aggregate value added, we rely on the United
States’ Bureau of Economic Anaysis’ industry value added tables available at http://www.bea.gov/
industry/io_histannual.htm. Because of i) changes in industry labels in 1987; and ii) a change of
classiﬁcations in 1998, we report the exact series used for each time period:
• 1947 to 1987: we sum the value added of “banking” (code 60), “Credit agencies other than
banks” (code 61) and “Security and commodity brokers” ( code 62).
• 1987to1998: wesumthevaleaddedof“Depositaryinstitutions”(code60), “Non-depositary
institutions” (code 61) and “Security and commodity brokers” (code 62).
• 1998 to 2009: we sum the value added of “Federal Reserve banks,c r e d i ti n t e r m e d i a t i o n ,a n d
related activities” (code 521 and 522), “Securities, commodity contracts, and investments”
(code 523) and “Funds, trusts, and other ﬁnancial vehicles” (code 525).
The share Σ is obtained dividing by the corresponding year’s aggregate GDP from the same value
added tables.
C.2 Numerical Method
The procedure consistsof perturbing each element of an initial vectorof parameters X by a random
shock drawn from a normal distribution in a 6-dimensional parameter space for exogenous wages:
γ,β,ε,κ and the two scale parameters in the matching functions, χ in the labor market and ς in the
credit market. With endogenous wages, the parameter space is7 - d i m e n s i o n a lw i t ht h ei n c l u s i o no f
the worker’s bargaining weight α.W er u np e r t u r b a t i o n so ft h es e to fp a r a m e t e r sX in a neighbor-
hood of the starting values of parameters, where perturbations are small: each parameter receives
am u l t i p l i c a t i v en o r m a ls h o c ko fv a r i a n c e1 / 6 0( e x o g e n o u sw ages) or 1/80 (endogenous wages).
We obtain corresponding values of the equilibrium variables θ, u and φ as well as a value of the
ﬁnancial sector’s share in GDP Σ.W eo n l yr e t a i nv a l u e so ft h ep a r a m e t e r sf o rw h i c hu is between 7
and 8% and for which q(θ) is between 0 and 1 and that satisfy our other empirical moments. Once
33as a m p l eo f1 0 0d r a w ss a t i s f y i n gt h e s ec r i t e r i ai so b t a i n e d ,an e wv e c t o ro fp a r a m e t e r sX  generat-
ing the largest Σ is selected to re-initiate the procedure. The iterations continue until reaching the
target for the ﬁnancial sector’s share in GDP and we call this ﬁrst procedure Step 1. Given that we
have an under-identiﬁed system, since there are several new parameters (in particular β,ε,κ,ς), we
believe that our method is transparent, and can be considereda sc o n v e n i e n ta saG M Mm e t h o d ,b u t
more adapted to a context where the multiplicity of parameters offers a fair amount of discretion.
The difference between a method of simulated annealing and ours is that the annealing method
accepts all perturbation raising an objective function, buta l s oa c c e p t ss o m ep e r t u r b a t i o n sr e d u c i n g
the objective function, with a probability which is exponential in the variation.
The second part of the exercise, labeled Step 2, is to provide examples of larger volatilities of
labor market tightness. With endogenous wages we replicate the logic of Step 1 but also shock the
bargaining power of workers and the value of leisure. We stop when we obtain a targeted elasticity
Λ of labor market tightness to productivity shocks. Af u l ld e s c r i p t i o no ft h ep r o c e d u r ea n dt h e
evolution of parameters across different iterations can be found in the Technical Appendix of the
working paper version.
34C.3 Results - Fixed Wage
Table 2: PARAMETER VALUES AND IMPLIED ELASTICITIES, FIXED WAGES
Parameter values Steady state values
Labor market Step1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2
matching elasticity η 0.5  0.5  Unemp. rate 6.5% 6.9%
ﬁxed wage   w 0.75  0.75  Average recruiting cost 3.28% 3.28%
job separation rate s 0.06  0.06  Credit market share Σ 3.05% 3.04%
vacancy cost γ 0.198 0.215
matching param. χ 0.422 0.460
Credit market
bank’s barg. weight β 0.85 0.86 Financial Multiplier and elasticities
matching elasticity ε 0.53 0.51
matching param. ς 0.056 0.055 Financial multiplier: MD
f 3.07 3.64
bank search costs κ 0.045 0.047 Elasticity of θ to y: Λ 19.5 23.0
project search costs e 0.049 0.047
Match Σ after 10 iterations, match Λ after 2 iterations  :r e m a i nﬁ x e d
Column Initial refers to the prior on parameters, Step 1 to the outcomes of perturbationsmatching
the share of ﬁnance in GDP. Step 2 to the outcomes of perturbations matching various targets for
the elasticity of θ to productivity shocks
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